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Abstract 
Reducing the psychological distance of climate change has repeatedly been proposed as 
one strategy to increase individuals’ motivation to respond to climate change. From the 
perspective of construal level theory, decreasing psychological distance should not itself 
influence people’s willingness to act but change the processes that underlie individual 
decision-making. We conducted two experiments in which we manipulated the psychological 
distance of climate change. We found that participants with a distant focus relied more on 
scepticism to represent risks and make decisions about supporting climate change, whereas 
participants with a proximal perspective relied more on fear when making such judgements. 
However, the predicted Fear x Distance interaction was only found when self-reported fear 
rather than experimentally manipulated fear was used as a moderator. Our results suggest that 
simply proximising won’t increase engagement and call for a more differentiated perspective 
on the effects of psychological distance in the context of climate change. 
 
Keywords: climate change, psychological distance, construal level theory, risk perception, 
mitigation, adaptation 
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1. Introduction 
A common explanation for currently insufficient public support to address climate 
change (e.g., European Commission, 2011; PEW Research Center, 2010) is that people 
perceive climate change as a distant threat: something that affects strangers, and that happens 
in remote times and places rather than in the here and now (Fleury-Bahi, 2008; Leiserowitz, 
2006; Lorenzoni, Nicholson-Cole, & Whitmarsh, 2007; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). The 
distance at which people perceive climate change could lead to the perspective that climate 
change risks are irrelevant to one’s self and that there is no need for personal action. To 
remedy this, it has repeatedly been suggested that highlighting the proximal consequences of 
climate change is an important strategy to engage and mobilize publics around this issue (e.g., 
CRED, 2009; Moser & Dilling, 2007; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). Although the 
proximising strategy has been proposed frequently, its effectiveness has rarely been tested in 
the context of climate change. Of more concern, the studies that have experimentally tested the 
proximising approach have not revealed the expected positive effects on individual support for 
addressing climate change (e.g., Shwom, Dan, & Dietz, 2008; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010).  
The missing positive effect of such proximising is counter-intuitive and may, at first 
glance, seem disappointing. However, it is not unexpected when considered from the 
perspective of dominant theoretical models of psychological distance. Construal level theory 
(Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010) argues that varying levels of psychological distance (e.g., 
here vs. far away) influence how people represent objects mentally and what information they 
consider when making judgments and decisions. In accordance with this perspective, we 
expect that proximising climate change should affect how climate change is mentally 
represented, and through this what people act on, not whether or not people act per se.  
Following the above reasoning, the aim of the present research was to reconsider the 
widely held belief that focusing on proximal (vs. distant) impacts of climate change should 
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straightforwardly increase people’s motivation to support mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
Before presenting two studies that tested this, we elaborate further on why considering 
psychological distance is crucial in the context of climate change and what kinds of 
information we expect people to rely on when they zoom in on proximal (or zoom out to 
distant) climate change consequences. 
1.1 Climate change as a distant threat  
Climate change and distance are two strongly entangled topics: Wherever greenhouse 
gases are emitted, they spread throughout the atmosphere and will contribute to global (distant) 
climate change. Similarly, the consequences of climate related actions are often felt by people 
other than those who carry these actions out both in space and time. The entanglement of 
distance and climate change is also obvious in the fact that many consequences of climate 
change, due to the inertia of the climate system, will only be manifest several decades from 
now. This is, from the perspective of an individual, a long time span and far away from one’s 
present situation. Finally, although it is certain that the climate is changing and will continue to 
do so, the exact magnitude and quality of future climate change impacts can never be 
absolutely known. This uncertainty can also be regarded as a form of psychological distance 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
Research on public perception of climate change indicates that distance is an important 
factor. When people are asked about how they think about climate change, they tend to 
perceive climate change as a threat that is more likely to affect strangers remote in time and 
space rather than oneself, the people one knows, or nearby places; in addition, climate change 
is perceived as a greater danger to the natural world than it is to humans (Bord, Fisher, & 
O’Connor, 1998; Fleury-Bahi, 2008; Leiserowitz, 2006; Lorenzoni, Leiserowitz, De Franca 
Doria, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Milfont, 2010). Somewhat in 
contrast to this general pattern, a recent study found that roughly 40–50% of participants 
perceive climate change as psychologically close on various dimensions of psychological 
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distance (Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012; see also The World Bank, 2009). Nonetheless, 
research suggests that at least a sizable part of the public perceives climate change as a distant 
threat.  
The perception of climate change as a distant threat is considered problematic because 
individuals’ perception of being personally at risk can be an important motivation to react to 
the respective risk (e.g., Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000; Miceli, Sotgiu, & Settanni, 
2008; Zaalberg, Midden, Meijnders, & McCalley, 2009). Indeed, the link between perceived 
personal risk and willingness to act on climate change has been observed in several studies 
(Brody, Grover, & Vedlitz, 2012; Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007; O’Connor, Bord, & Fisher, 
1999; O’Connor, Bord, Yarnal, & Wiefek, 2002; Terpstra, 2011; Zaalberg et al., 2009). 
1.2 Climate change and proximising climate change from the perspective of construal 
level theory 
Against the above backdrop, the idea that emphasising proximal consequences of 
climate change should increase people’s motivation to act is intuitively appealing. However, 
previous attempts to implement this idea raise doubt about the effectiveness of proximising 
climate change. To our knowledge, only four studies have examined the impact of proximising 
on people’s motivation to act on climate change, and none reveals unambiguously supportive 
evidence. Shwom and colleagues (2008) provided their participants with information about 
climate change trends either on a regional or a national scale. Contrary to the common 
expectations, the extent to which participants endorsed climate change policies did not differ 
across conditions. In a similar vein, Spence and Pidgeon (2010) framed climate change in 
proximal versus distant terms. The proximal frame included a text on national consequences, a 
proximal map illustrating potential flooding caused by sea-level rise, and three photographs of 
urban flooding that were recognisable as places in the UK (where the study was conducted). 
The distant frame included similar stimuli but with reference to continental Europe. Again, 
proximising climate change had no effect on attitudes towards climate change mitigation.  
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The third study we are aware of was by Scannell and Gifford (2013), who provided 
members of the general public with information posters describing either one broad distant 
impact of climate change (sea levels rising) or a proximal impact specific to the area they lived 
in (one of the following three: forest fires, beetle infestation, rising sea levels). Relative to a 
third condition, where no information was provided, the proximally framed information poster 
increased participants’ engagement with climate change (including affective, cognitive, and 
behavioural aspects of engagement). In contrast, people’s engagement with climate change did 
not differ between the distantly framed poster and the control condition. Thus, this study 
suggests that providing information about proximal climate change may be helpful to increase 
people’s engagement with climate change. However, two aspects of this study make it difficult 
to draw firm conclusions about the specific advantages of zooming in on proximal climate 
change relative to a more distant approach. First, Scannell and Gifford (2013) did not directly 
compare the proximal and the distant frame. Second, they varied not only the psychological 
distance of impact but also the type of impact (sea level rising vs. forest fires, beetle 
infestation, rising sea levels); this raises the possibility that effects in the “proximal” condition 
may have been multiply determined.  
The fourth study again compared locally versus globally framed climate change 
information and compared the effects of these frames to a control condition with no 
information about climate change (Schoenefeld & McCauley, 2015). The study again failed to 
reveal a statistically significant main effect. That is, participants’ ratings of the importance of 
climate change, their intentions to personally mitigate climate change, and their support for 
mitigation policies were identical across the three conditions. Thus, while proximising climate 
change impacts is a “common sense” strategy to increase engagement (Devine-Wright, 2013), 
to date there is limited evidence that this strategy actually works. 
This finding may not be so surprising when considered from the perspective of 
construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). Construal level theory (CLT) starts 
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from the assumption that humans can only directly experience the present situation. Everything 
that is removed from the current situation, be it on a spatial (here vs. far away), temporal (now 
vs. future/past), social (me vs. others), or hypothetical (certain vs. uncertain) dimension, needs 
to be mentally construed. The further away an object is from the present situation of a person, 
the more effort she has to make to construe it, and the more abstract and generalised the 
resulting mental representation will be (high-level construal). Conversely, the present situation 
offers a lot of context-specific information and is rich in details; it involves no or only little 
mental construal (low-level construal). In simpler terms, this means that when we think of an 
object as close versus distant, we form different mental representations of it. These 
representations then guide subsequent judgments and decisions. Thus, psychological distance – 
the perception of when, where, to whom, and whether an event occurs (Trope & Liberman, 
2010) – affects what evaluations and even behavioural intentions are based on.  
Illustrative of this, one study (Ledgerwood, Trope, & Chaiken, 2010) found that 
participants with a proximal and concrete perspective considered primarily low-level incidental 
circumstantial information (e.g., other people’s opinion) when they evaluated a policy. 
Conversely, when participants with a more distant (abstract) mind-set evaluated the same 
policy, they were guided by their broader values, which are commonly regarded as overarching 
orientations that are relatively stable across time and different situations (i.e., high-level 
construal). Eyal and colleagues (2009) found the same pattern with regard to behavioural 
intentions: When intentions were represented in the distant future, (high-level construal) values 
better predicted intentions, whereas (low-level construal) feasibility considerations were better 
at predicting intentions in the near future (see also Rabinovich, Morton, & Postmes, 2010). 
Considering that distance influences what evaluations and intentions are based on – 
rather than directly affecting people’s motivation to act – it may be less surprising that Spence 
and Pidgeon (2010), Shwom et al. (2008), and Schoenefeld and McCauley (2015) did not find 
any direct impact of distance framing on the level of policy support and attitudes towards 
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climate change mitigation. According to CLT, proximising climate change would not be 
expected to have a direct effect on people’s overall willingness to respond to the challenges 
arising from climate change – as long as climate change will somehow and sometime become 
relevant to the individual (Ledgerwood, Trope, & Chaiken, 2010; Ledgerwood, Wakslak, & 
Wang, 2010). Instead, when people have a proximal perspective, they should preferentially 
consider concrete low-level information (e.g., other people’s opinions, feasibility 
considerations) for representing climate change, its consequences, and potential response 
strategies, while those with a distant focus are expected to rely more on abstract high-level 
information (e.g., their own values). Thus CLT would predict that variations in distance 
framing should interact with other things – things that represent low- or high-level construals – 
to determine individual responses. 
1.3 Fear and scepticism as low-level and high-level information 
Two factors that are relevant for how people think and decide in the context of climate 
change and that differ with regard to their level of construal, are fear and scepticism. The role 
of fear as a driver of personal action is well documented in general, for example with regard to 
health-related behaviours (e.g., Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011). In terms of climate change, 
fear is also regarded as a motivator for taking action (Maibach, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 
2008; Moser, 2007; Weber, 2006) and there is some evidence showing that when people are 
afraid of climate change (or have other similar negative feelings), they perceive climate change 
more as a risk, have more favourable attitudes towards mitigation, and are more willing to 
mitigate (Leiserowitz, 2006; Meijnders, Midden, & Wilke, 2001; Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012; 
Van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010; for a more critical perspective on fear appeals, see for 
example O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009).  
We assume that the experience of fear represents a lower-level construal relative to 
more abstract beliefs about climate change (see below). This assumption is grounded in the 
division of emotions into low-level and high-level construal emotions. Low-level construal 
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emotions such as pain, hunger, sadness, anger, and fear are spontaneous reactions to the 
immediate situation that do not involve mental construal (cf. Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 
2007). High-level construal emotions, on the other hand, are those emotions that require 
distancing on at least one dimension of psychological distance. For example, nostalgia and 
anticipation mean thinking about things that happened in the past or will happen in the future 
and therefore involve distancing on the temporal dimension of psychological distance. Because 
people rely more strongly on information that is consistent with their current mind-set, we 
assume that people who adopt a proximal perspective on climate change will rely more on the 
immediate experience of fear (a low-level construal) as a source of information about whether 
they should act than people who adopt a more (spatially) distant perspective.  
In contrast to the hypothesized role of fear as low-level construal, when people adopt a 
distant perspective on climate change, their subsequent decisions should be guided by abstract 
construals such as their broad beliefs and values. In relation to this, the second factor we 
considered as a potential source of decision-making about climate change was scepticism. 
Scepticism refers to the degree to which people believe in the reality of human-made climate 
change and its present and future consequences. Scepticism is relevant because it undermines 
people’s motivation to address climate change (cf. Lorenzoni et al., 2007); why should anyone 
be concerned about climate change and motivated to act if they do not believe that climate 
change is real, potentially dangerous, and caused by humans? On the other hand, if a person’s 
level of scepticism is low, then he or she is more likely to support mitigation (Joireman, 
Truelove, & Duell, 2010; Leiserowitz, 2006) and adaptation (Blennow & Persson, 2009). From 
the perspective of CLT, scepticism – as a collection of abstract beliefs about climate change, its 
causes, and possible consequences – can be considered as a higher-level construal relative to 
the more concrete experience of fear. Because high-level construals are more informative for 
representations of distant objects, we expected that people with a distant perspective on climate 
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change would rely more on sceptical beliefs than on fear to represent risks and make decisions 
about supporting climate change responses. 
1.4 The present research  
Like previous studies, the present research is interested in the role distance plays in the 
context of climate change action. However, we approach this issue via the perspective of CLT 
(Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010). In accordance with this perspective, we do not expect that 
proximising climate change will automatically increase individual motivations to act. Rather, 
based on CLT we expect that manipulating psychological distance (i.e., a proximal vs. distant 
focus on climate change) should influence people’s mental construals of climate change and 
consequently the kind of information they act on (i.e., information that reflects low- versus 
high- level construals; Trope & Liberman, 2010).  
To test these predictions we conducted two experiments. In Study 1 participants 
received either proximal or distant information about climate change and then answered 
questions about their risk perceptions, their willingness to respond to climate change, their 
emotional responses to climate change, and their beliefs (i.e., scepticism). We predicted that 
participants with a proximal perspective would rely more on fear to represent risks and make 
decisions about supporting climate change responses. Conversely, people with a distant 
perspective should rely more on scepticism when representing risks and deciding how to act. 
The results partially supported the predicted interactions. To replicate the findings of Study 1 
and to learn more about the causal role of fear, Study 2 again presented participants with either 
a proximal or a distant framing of climate change. In addition, Study 2 systematically varied 
the level of fear (instead of simply measuring it). While Study 2 failed to produce the expected 
interactions between proximising and manipulated levels of fear, it revealed the same 
interactions as in Study 1 when self-reported fear was used as a moderator.   
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2. Study 1  
2.1 Material and methods  
2.1.1 Participants and procedure 
Participants were 80 Psychology students from a University in the UK who participated 
in exchange for course credit. The average age was 20.6 years (SD = 5.50; range: 18 to 50). 
The proportion of females was 82%. Upon arrival in the classroom, students received a 
questionnaire that introduced climate change with either a proximal or distant focus (randomly 
assigned). They answered the remainder of the questionnaire and then were debriefed.  
2.1.2 Manipulation and manipulation checks 
Manipulation. Two texts about the causes and consequences of climate change were 
used to induce a proximal (vs. a distant) perspective on climate change. In the proximal 
condition the text (Appendix A) referred three times to the “UK” whereas the in the distant 
condition, the text referred to “all over the world”, “across the globe”, or to “the planet” in the 
same places.  
Manipulation check. To check whether focusing on proximal (vs. distant) impacts of 
climate change elicited concrete (vs. abstract) thinking styles, we asked participants to group 
30 different climate change impacts (e.g., “famine”, “population migration”). It was expected 
that participants with an abstract mind-set (distant condition) would think broadly and 
consequently use relatively few categories to classify the objects. Conversely, individuals who 
were primed with a concrete (proximal) mind-set were expected to refer to more categories to 
classify the same objects (cf. Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002). When the number of 
categories was compared, no statistically significant difference was found between the 
proximal (M = 4.29, SD = 1.56) and distant condition (M = 4.42, SD = 1.50; t(66)= 0.37, p = 
.71). In other words, we cannot be certain that the manipulation effectively induced a concrete 
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versus abstract mind-set in the proximal versus distant condition respectively, although the 
texts themselves clearly do refer to proximal versus distal impacts of climate change.  
2.1.3 Measures 
2.1.3.1 Perceived risk. To measure the extent of perceived risk, we asked participants to 
judge the likelihood of seven possible consequences from climate change (1 = very unlikely, 5 
= very likely). To maintain the integrity of the manipulation, in the proximal condition we used 
questions relating to spatially proximal impacts whereas in the distant condition questions 
referred to distant impacts (Dietz et al., 2007; Leiserowitz, 2006; O’Connor et al., 1999, see 
Appendix C for all items used in Study 1). The proximal and distant items formed two reliable 
scales (Cronbach’s αproximal = .76, αdistant = .82). 
2.1.3.2 Low-level construal fear of climate change. Participants indicated the extent to 
which they experienced 14 different emotions when thinking about (proximal vs. distant) 
climate change. Out of these 14 adjectives (e.g., bored, guilty, reassured), four were used to 
capture participants’ levels of fear (anxious, nervous, tense, fearful; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010; 
α = .87).  
2.1.3.3 High-construal level scepticism. We used six items to assess participants’ level 
of scepticism (Whitmarsh, 2009; Whitmarsh & O’Neill, 2010). Participants were asked to 
indicate how much they agreed with these statements (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree; α = .79). 
2.1.3.4 Support for mitigation policies. Participants indicated their support (1 = 
definitely oppose, 5 = definitely support) for 11 policies that we presented as steps to decrease 
the amount of greenhouse gases “as a society”. The 11 items (Nilsson, von Borgstede, & Biel, 
2004; Prillwitz & Barr, 2011), formed a reliable scale (α = .73).  
2.1.3.5 Personal intentions to mitigate. We used 10 items (Lowe et al., 2006; O’Connor 
et al., 1999) to assess people’s future intentions to engage in actions to mitigate climate 
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change. The topics covered were mobility, energy-saving, consumption, and political 
behaviours. On a 5-point Likert scale, participants indicated how likely they were to take each 
action in the future to combat climate change (1 = very unlikely, 5 = very likely; α = .79).  
2.1.3.6 Support for adaptation policies. Participants were presented with a brief 
introduction explaining the need and the rationale underlying the idea of adaptation. To assess 
support for pro-active adaptation policies, we developed a catalogue of 12 adaptation 
measures that were guided by adaptation research (IPCC, 2007a). The proposed adaptation 
measures focused on conservation of species, protection against water scarcity, heat, and 
floods. Participants again indicated the degree of their support for each of these policies (1 = 
definitely oppose, 5 = definitely support; α = .75).  
2.1.3.7 Personal intentions to adapt. Participants rated the likelihood of nine steps they 
could take individually to adapt to climate change. These actions were aimed at reducing the 
vulnerability of themselves, other people, or nature to negative climate change impacts. 
Participants answered the question about which actions they were likely to take in the future on 
a five-point Likert scale (1 = very unlikely, 5 = very likely; α = .77). 
2.2 Results  
Main effects. We used multiple linear regression analyses with distance as single predictor 
to test for main effects on participants’ willingness to respond to climate change. As 
anticipated, focusing on either proximal or distant impacts of climate change had no effect on 
people’s motivation to mitigate climate change (p-values for policy support and personal 
intentions ≥ .74, Table 1) or adapt to possible consequences (p-values for policy support and 
personal intentions ≥ .88, Table 1).  
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Table 1 
Simple main effects of proximising 
 Mprox SDprox Mdist SDdist R2 β df p 
Mitigation policy support 3.58 .52 3.54 .52 .00 .04 78 .74 
Mitigation intention 3.43 .57 3.43 .66 .00 .00 78 .99 
Adaptation policy support  3.69 .49 3.67 .51 .00 .02 77 .90 
Adaptation intentions 3.31 .68 3.34 .63 .00 -.02 77 .88 
Note. prox = proximal framing of climate change, dist = distant framing of climate change. 
 
Interaction effects. To address the question of whether varying foci on climate change 
influenced the extent to which participants relied more on low-level construal fear or high-level 
construal scepticism to represent climate change risks and to decide about responses, we 
explored potential interaction effects using a series of regression analyses (Appendix D). In 
each model, the distance manipulation, fear, and scepticism were entered in the first step. We 
also included gender as covariate to ensure that the effects found were independent of this 
demographic variable. In the second step, the focal interaction terms (Distance x Fear and 
Distance x Scepticism) were added to the model. If adding the interaction terms resulted in a 
statistically significant improvement of the model, simple slope analyses were carried out to 
better understand and visualize the interactions (for details, see Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 
2003).  
When risk perceptions were used as the dependent variables, it was found that people 
were differently influenced by fear depending on whether they thought of proximal or distant 
climate change  (ß = .33, t = 2.24, p = .03; Figure 1A and Appendix D): For participants with a 
proximal perspective, (low-level construal) fear was positively associated with risk perceptions 
(ß = .34, t = 2.51, p = .02), that is, the more people were afraid of climate change, the more 
they perceived it as a risk. Conversely, reported fear and risk perceptions were not 
systematically related to each other among participants with a distant mind-set (ß = -.11, t = -
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.76, p = .45). This pattern is consistent with our prediction that low-level construal fear was 
more informative for participants with a proximal perspective.  
Conversely, and again in line with our predictions, (high-level construal) scepticism 
was more informative for participants with a distant perspective (ß = -.58, t = -4.38, p < .001) 
than for those who were primed with proximal climate change (ß = .10, t = .71, p = .48). More 
specifically, the more sceptical participants were, the less likely they judged climate change 
risks. This second interaction effect (ß = .47, t = 3.46, p < .001; Appendix D) is illustrated in 
Figure 1B.. 
With respect to personal intentions, none of the predicted interactions were found. In 
contrast to our prediction, when people made decisions about acting personally on climate 
change, (high-level construal) scepticism was not only more informative for participants with a 
psychologically distant perspective but also for those with a proximal perspective. More 
specifically, the less sceptical people were about the reality of climate change, the more willing 
they were to take personal action. The absence of the predicted interaction and the main effect 
of scepticism suggest that participants generally relied more on their abstract beliefs than on 
fear when making decisions about personal intentions. 
In terms of policy support, two interaction effects emerged: When examining 
participants’ decision about support for mitigation policies, the interaction between distance 
and fear on willingness to support policies (ß =.37, t = 2.29, p = .03, Figure 1C and Appendix 
D) looked similar to the one observed for risk perceptions (Figure 1A): The more people 
reported fear in the proximal condition, the more they were willing to support mitigation 
policies. However, this effect was not itself significant, ß = .18, t = 1.21, p = .23. 
Contrary to what could be expected from the literature (e.g., Meijnders et al., 2001; Van 
Zomeren et al., 2010), in the distant condition, fear was significantly negatively (rather than 
positively) related to support for mitigation policies, ß = -.32, t = -2.02, p = .05. One 
explanation for this negative association is that low-level construal fear and the distant mind-
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set may be represented at different construal levels. Because of this mismatch participants with 
a distant mind-set could have found it more difficult to process and integrate their feelings and 
the psychological distance information than participants with a proximal mind-set. As a result, 
participants in the distant condition probably had an experience that was less fluent and 
therefore less persuasive (see Kim, Rao, & Lee, 2009) than participants in the proximal 
condition, where fear and mind-set were represented at the same construal level. We return to 
this issue of “fit” in the discussion section.  
Looking at this interaction differently, however, it can be seen that distance framing did 
have an effect for people who reported higher levels of fear. Specifically, at high levels of fear, 
proximising was positively associated with support for mitigation policies (ß = .31, t = 2.07, 
p = .04). At low levels of fear, there was no effect of the framing manipulation on mitigation 
policy support (ß = -.19, t = -1.25, p = .22). As such, there is some support for the hypothesis in 
the pattern of this variable.  
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Figure 1. Simple slopes of psychological distance predicting risk perceptions and policy 
support for 1 SD below the mean of low-level construal fear (A, C) and 1 SD above the mean 
of fear and for 1 SD below the mean of high-level construal scepticism and 1 SD above the 
mean of scepticism (B, D). 
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With regard to support for adaptation policies, another interaction emerged (ß = .31, t = 
2.07, p = .04) that was in line with the prediction that (high-level construal) scepticism should 
be more informative for participants with a distant mind-set than for those with a proximal 
mind-set. Specifically, scepticism was negatively associated with support for adaptation 
policies in the distant condition (ß = -.60, t = -4.20, p < .001; Figure 1D). In contrast, for 
participants who had a proximal mind-set, scepticism was not a relevant source of information 
(ß = -.16, t = -1.03, p = .31).  
2.3 Discussion 
The results of Study 1 showed that focusing on proximal climate change (vs. thinking 
about distant climate change) did not straightforwardly increase participants’ mean-level 
support for response strategies. Instead, we found evidence that distance interacted with other 
things to determine individual responses: The overall pattern of interactions suggests that 
people with a proximal mind-set tend to rely more on low-level construal fear to make climate-
related judgments and decisions than people with a distant mind-set. In contrast, people with a 
distant mind-set are more strongly influenced by high-level construal scepticism when thinking 
about climate change and possible response than people with a proximal mind-set.  
One limitation of Study 1 was that the manipulation check did not show any differences 
in thinking styles (i.e., concrete vs. abstract) between the two conditions, although this was 
assumed to be one consequence of the proximal versus distant framing of climate change. 
Hence, although the conditions produced different tendencies in terms of what kind of 
information participants were influenced by, we cannot be certain that this is due solely to a 
difference in the extent of concrete versus abstract thinking, which is at the core of CLT. 
Although the formal aspects of the manipulation check (grouping climate change impacts) 
were very similar to manipulation checks that were successfully used in previous studies from 
a CLT perspective (cf. Liberman et al., 2002), the task might have been too demanding in 
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terms of the elements participants had to group (potential future climate change impacts). We 
therefore think that this manipulation check was not ideal.   
A second potential shortcoming of Study 1 is that the proximal and distant 
experimental conditions used different questions to measure risk perceptions. That is, when 
risk perceptions were used as a dependent variable, the object of the risk judgements differed 
across conditions (e.g., “Water shortages will occur where I live vs. in much of the world”). 
Using the different risk judgements as a single dependent variable may in principle have 
produced distorted results.  
Third, Study 1 only manipulated psychological distance and then used observed 
spontaneous individual differences in low-construal level fear and high-construal level 
scepticism as second predictors. It would be instructive to move a step forward and also 
experimentally vary the second part of the interactions (i.e., fear and/or scepticism). Thereby 
more control over the central variables would be achieved and clearer conclusions about the 
causality of the involved variables could be drawn.  
3. Study 2 
To replicate the findings of Study 1 and to address its shortcomings, we conducted a 
second study that consisted of two phases. We first developed and pre-tested experimental 
manipulations to induce different levels of fear and psychological distance. We then carried out 
a field experiment in which we tested the predicted 2 (psychological distance: proximal vs. 
distant) x 2 (fear: low, high) interaction.  
3.1 Development and pre-tests of experimental manipulations 
3.1.1 Proximising pilot 
Participants and procedure.  One hundred twenty-five students participated in the 
online pilot studies. Of these, 36 were excluded because their reading speed during the 
manipulation was implausibly high (faster than 800 words per minute), which made it unlikely 
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that they processed the information. The mean age of the 89 remaining participants was 25.4 
years (SD = 10.10; range: 18 to 66). The proportion of females was 65.9%. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two distance conditions where they read a text, completed the 
manipulation checks, and indicated how they generally perceived the text. As an incentive, 
participants could enter a lottery to win one of three Amazon vouchers worth £20. 
Proximity manipulation. Like in Study 1, distance was manipulated by two different 
texts that focused on the impacts of climate change either in the UK or in the world. However, 
the manipulation differed from Study 1 in that it referred more than 20 times (vs. three times in 
Study 1) to geographically proximal or distant places (e.g., “in the UK” vs. “worldwide”; 
Appendix B).  
Manipulation checks. We used two approaches to evaluate the effect of the proximising 
manipulation. First, we presented participants with five semantic differential-type scales on 
which they were asked to indicate how proximal or distant climate change felt to them (e.g., 
very close vs. very distant; cf. Van Boven, Kane, McGraw, & Dale, 2010; α = .85; Appendix 
C). Second, we included a measure that was intended to measure the effect of proximising on 
people’s way of thinking (i.e., concrete vs. abstract). We included 11 pictures from the Picture 
Completion Test (Petermann & Petermann, 2007). We assumed that participants in the 
proximal condition should adopt a more concrete (vs. abstract) thinking style and perform 
better (i.e., get more correct answers) in detecting missing parts in the 11 pictures than those in 
the distant condition (see also Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & Alony, 2006).  
Results. Somewhat unexpectedly, the ratings of perceived psychological distance did 
not differ between participants in the proximal condition (M = 3.28, SD = 1.14) and 
participants in the distant conditions (M = 3.17, SD = 1.15, t(86) = 0.43, p = .67, r = .05). By 
contrast, there were differences between the two groups in terms of how concretely they were 
thinking. In line with CLT, those in the proximal condition performed better in detecting 
missing parts in a selection of pictures taken from the Picture Completion Test (M = 7.73, SD = 
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1.63) than those in the distant condition (M = 6.80, SD = 2.14, t(87) = 2.32, p = .02, r = .24). 
Taken together, the pre-tests suggest that proximising has no effect on explicit evaluations (i.e., 
perceived psychological distance) but affects people’s thinking styles in a way that is 
consistent with the intention of the manipulation.  
3.1.2 Fear pilot 
Participants and procedure.  Sixty-one students participated in the online pilot studies. 
Fifty-three watched the entire video and were included in the analyses. The mean age of these 
participants was 25.1 years (SD = 7.48; range: 18 to 47). The proportion of females was 51.9%. 
After watching the video, participants completed the manipulation checks, and indicated how 
they generally perceived the video. The same incentive was used as in the first pre-test. 
Fear manipulation. Participants watched a video (approx. 3 min) that – by means of 
overlaid text, stills, video scenes, and a graph – described the causes and consequences of 
climate change. Both videos first explained that climate change was the average weather over 
thirty years, what and how much had already changed, and that humans were responsible for it 
to a large extent. The high-fear version then showed a selection of expected consequences of 
higher temperatures, using dramatic music, a font primarily used in headlines to arouse 
attention (Impact), vivid and drastic visual information about climate change such as a dark 
sky with lightning, underlined with the sound of thunder and howling wind (more severe 
weather events), a car carried away fast by a stream of water (floods), and cow carcasses on 
dry land (drought). The low-fear version showed the same consequences but had emotionally 
neutral music, used a more neutral font (Arial and Arial Black), and showed less drastic 
visual information such as a satellite image of a storm, a parked car with water up to its lights, 
and sheep on dry land without any grass to graze on. In addition, the two versions differed in 
terms of how the expected temperature increase was framed: In the high-fear version, the upper 
limit of the possible temperature increase was indicated (“up to 6.5°C by 2100”; IPCC, 2007b), 
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whereas the lower boundary was indicated in the low-fear version (“2.4°C by 2100”; IPCC, 
2007b). Finally, the videos tried to avoid geographical cues that would bias the videos towards 
proximal or distant places. 
Manipulation check. To measure the extent of elicited fear, we presented participants 
with 15 different emotions and asked them to “make a fast and spontaneous assessment of how 
much this video makes you feel…” Six emotions were used to measure fear (tense, frightened, 
threatened, nervous, anxious, fearful); the other nine emotions (e.g., compassion, comforted) 
were added to make the intention of the video less salient. The six fear items formed a reliable 
scale, Cronbach’s α = .94.  
Results. The fear manipulation showed the intended effects: Participants in the high fear 
condition reported higher levels of fear (M = 2.65, SD = 1.10) than those in the low fear 
condition (M = 1.99, SD = 0.79, t(51) = 2.47, p = .02; effect size: r = .33). 
3.1.3 Ruling out unintended effects  
To rule out unintended effects of either manipulation, we tested the effect of the fear 
manipulation on perceived psychological distance (we did not include the picture completion 
test in the conditions that pre-tested fear and therefore could not explore the effects of fear on 
the level of construal) and the effect of proximising on the level of reported fear. Using the 
same six fear items (α = .92), it was found that participants in the proximal condition did not 
report more (or less) fear (M = 2.13, SD = 0.78) than those in the distant condition (M = 2.42, 
SD = 0.88, t(86) = 1.62, p = .11, r = .17). Thus, the distance manipulation elicited different 
levels of concrete versus abstract thinking without having unintended effects on fear. Neither 
did the fear manipulation lead to different perceptions of psychological distance (5 items, α = 
.90) between participants in the low fear (M = 3.69, SD = 1.36) and high fear conditions (M = 
3.31, SD = 1.41, t(51) = 1.00, p = .32, r = .11). 
According to research on fear appeals, fear can undermine threat-reducing behaviours 
and elicit unproductive reactions instead (e.g., threat denial) when people believe that they are 
Proximising climate change reconsidered 23
not personally capable of responding to the threat or that the available response measures are 
ineffective (e.g., Maloney et al., 2011). To assess the possible influence of either manipulation 
on efficacy beliefs, both pre-tests included three items that measured beliefs about the efficacy 
of mitigation measures in general (e.g., “Introducing new carbon regulations will significantly 
decrease greenhouse gas emissions”, Appendix C) and four items that measured participants’ 
self-efficacy beliefs (e.g., “I am able to act effectively on climate change”, Appendix C). 
Participants answered both scales on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = 
strongly agree). The seven items formed two sufficiently reliable scales in both pre-tests 
(general efficacy beliefs: α = .70 / .73; self-efficacy beliefs: α = .67 / .63).  
It was found that neither the fear nor the proximising manipulation affected 
participants’ confidence in their personal ability to mitigate climate change (p-values ≥ .38). 
Neither did the fear manipulation affect participants’ confidence in the efficacy of mitigation 
measures (p ≥ .73). However, participants in the proximal condition were marginally more 
positive about the effectiveness of mitigation measures (M = 3.68, SD = 0.81) than participants 
in the distant condition (M = 3.38, SD = 0.83, t(84) = 1.69, p = .10, r = .18). In other words, we 
met our goal to create fear messages that maintained similar levels of perceived efficacy. 
Moreover, it seems that proximal messages may have a weak positive effect on people’s beliefs 
about the effectiveness of mitigation measures.  
3.2 Main study: Materials and methods 
3.2.1 Participants and procedure  
Participants were recruited through email lists (current and former students from a University 
in the UK), online ads (Craigslist, Facebook, online newspaper), and through different forums. 
As incentive we announced a prize draw with different prize options (e.g., iPods, vouchers).  
In total, 344 participants completed the survey. To ensure good data quality we used 
three criteria to include participants. First, we only included participants who had confirmed 
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that they were participating seriously (Reips, 2007). Second, we only included participants who 
watched at least 75% of the video (fear manipulation) and had a maximal reading speed of 800 
words per minute (proximising manipulation). Third, only residents of the UK were considered 
for analysis. When these three criteria were applied, the sample included 335 participants. Of 
these, five participants were excluded because they had more than ten missing values. The 
mean age of the 330 participants was 32.0 years (SD = 16.18; range: 17 to 81). The proportion 
of females was 56.4%. Although the sample was not demographically representative of the UK 
population, it included participants from various socio-economic backgrounds (Appendix E).  
As a cover story, participants were asked to evaluate two alternative forms of 
communicating climate change (i.e., text vs. video) in order to help us refine materials for a 
future study. Each participant watched a video that induced either low or high levels of fear 
and read a text that either focused on proximal or distant climate change. After each 
manipulation, relevant processes were evaluated. After the two manipulations more general 
individual orientations to climate change were assessed. We then asked participants to indicate 
their support for steps to respond to climate change. Finally, participants answered some 
demographic questions and were debriefed. 
To ensure that the presentation of either manipulation did not consistently influence the 
other, we counter-balanced the sequence in which participants watched the fear video and read 
the distance text. However, because the order in which the fear appeals and the proximal versus 
distant information were presented did not affect the dependent variables (see 3.2.3), we 
collapsed data across fear and distance, thereby reducing the study to a 2 (fear: low vs. high) x 
2 (distance: proximal vs. distant) design. 0F1 
                                                 
1 To test whether the order in which the fear appeals and the proximal versus distant information were presented 
had an effect on the dependent variables, we carried out a three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with fear 
(low vs. high), distance (proximal vs. distant), and order of manipulations (fear first vs. distance first) as main 
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3.2.2 Manipulation and manipulation checks 
We used the same manipulations to vary the levels of fear and proximity as in the pre-
tests. To enhance the proximal versus distant priming, we added three questions framed as 
“reading checks” that repeated some of the condition-specific information. We also included 
some of the manipulation checks in Study 2. Specifically, we used the same emotion terms to 
check the effect of fear as in the pre-test. The six emotions, again intermixed with nine 
emotions that were unrelated to fear, formed a reliable scale (α = .93, see Appendix C for all 
items used in Study 2). The fear manipulation showed the intended effects: Participants in the 
high fear condition reported higher levels of fear (M = 2.55, SD = 1.02) than those in the low 
fear condition (M = 2.01, SD = 0.79, t(327) = 5.42, p < .001; effect size: r = .29).  
To assess perceived psychological distance of climate change, participants were 
presented with the same five semantic differential-type scales used in the pre-test (α = .90). As 
anticipated, the ratings of perceived psychological distance were marginally lower among 
participants in the proximal condition (M = 3.33, SD = 1.41) than among participants in the 
distant conditions (M = 3.59, SD = 1.30, t(328) = 1.74, p = .08, r = .10).  
As in the pre-tests, we found no unintended effects of the manipulations: Fear did not 
affect perceived psychological proximity, nor did proximising affect self-reported fear (both t-
tests were not statistically significant, p-values ≥ .32; Table 2). We also found no effects of 
either fear or proximising on levels of response efficacy beliefs (3 items, α = .80) or self-
efficacy beliefs (4 items, α = .80; the four t-test were statistically not significant, p-values ≥ 
.23). We therefore were confident that we met our goal to create messages that influenced the 
intended constructs but left other constructs largely unaffected.  
                                                                                                                                                          
effects. The analyses of the order manipulation did not reveal any three-way interaction that was statistically 
significant at the 5% significance level.  
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3.2.3 Dependent variables 
Perceived risk. To assess the extent to which participants considered climate change as 
a personally relevant risk, we asked them to judge the likelihood that four personal risks (e.g., 
“Certain effects of climate change will impair my health”) and five local risks (Dietz et al., 
2007; Leiserowitz, 2006) would occur due to climate change. To make the purpose of the study 
less obvious to participants, these five proximal consequences were additionally presented on 
the global level. Because of their conceptual similarity and based on inter-item correlations we 
combined the local and personal risk items into a single personal and proximal risk scale. The 
nine items formed a reliable scale (α = .88).  
Support for mitigation policies. Participants indicated their support for 11 policies that 
we presented as steps to decrease the amount of greenhouse gases “as a society” (Nilsson et al., 
2004; Prillwitz & Barr, 2011; α = .85).  
Personal intentions to mitigate. We used 11 items (Lowe et al., 2006; O’Connor et al., 
1999) to assess people’s future intentions to engage in actions to mitigate climate change (α = 
.79).  
3.2 Results 
To test our hypothesis that participants with a proximal perspective on climate change 
would rely more on low-level construal fear when they make risk judgments and decisions 
about responses to climate change, we conducted a two-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
with fear (low vs. high) and distance (proximal vs. distant) as factors. We also included gender 
and age as covariates to hold their influence constant across conditions.  
Consistent with Study 1, portraying climate change in proximal (vs. distant) terms did 
not have a direct effect on participants’ willingness to respond to climate change or on their 
efficacy beliefs (Table 2). However, participants who read the text with a more proximal focus 
on climate change reported higher personal and proximal risk perceptions (M = 3.49, SD = 
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0.77) than participants in the distant condition (M = 3.31, SD = 0.69, t(328) = 2.25, p = .03, r = 
.12). Fear did not have a direct effect on any of the dependent variables (p-values ≥ .23; Table 
3).  
Table 2 
Main effects of proximising 
 Mprox SDprox Mdist SDdist t df p 
Personal and proximal risk 
perception 
3.49 0.77 3.31 0.69 2.25 328 .03 
Distant risk perceptions 4.17 0.77 4.26 0.69 1.22 328 .22 
Mitigation policy support 3.37 0.76 3.36 0.75 0.11 328 .91 
Mitigation intention 3.40 0.70 3.45 0.69 0.64 328 .53 
Response efficacy beliefs 3.60 0.99 3.57 0.87 0.28 328 .78 
Self-efficacy beliefs 3.13 0.77 3.18 0.80 0.49 328 .62 
Note. prox = proximal framing of climate change, dist = distant framing of climate change. 
 
Table 3 
Main effects of fear 
 Mlow SDlow Mhigh SDhigh t df p 
Personal and proximal risk 
perception 
3.39 0.74 3.41 0.72 0.29 328 .77 
Distant risk perceptions 4.21 0.77 4.22 0.69 0.10 328 .92 
Mitigation policy support 3.34 0.78 3.39 0.73 0.68 328 .50 
Mitigation intention 3.40 0.70 3.45 0.69 0.68 328 .50 
Response efficacy beliefs 3.52 0.92 3.65 0.95 1.19 328 .23 
Self-efficacy beliefs 3.19 0.78 3.13 0.80 0.66 328 .51 
Note. low = low fear video, high = high fear video. 
 
Contrary to our prediction that participants would rely more on low-level construal fear 
when they have a proximal (vs. distant) perspective, none of the three Proximity (proximal vs. 
distant) x Fear (low vs. high) interaction terms was statistically significant (p-values ≥ .28; 
Appendix F). This was surprising, given the relatively clear interaction patterns in Study 1 and 
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the successful pilot studies and manipulation checks. One possible explanation for the lack of 
interaction effects is that experimentally induced fear (Study 2) may have had a different effect 
on people than what we assessed by self-reported levels of fear in Study 1. To explore this 
possibility further, additional interaction analyses were carried out, using self-reported levels of 
fear – rather than the two experimental fear conditions – as moderator.  
When we analysed the data using the same regression analysis approach as in Study 1, 
again controlling for age and gender, we found that people’s risk judgments were differently 
influenced by fear depending on whether they thought in terms of proximal or distant climate 
change  (i.e., a significant interaction: ß = .15, t = 2.04, p = .04, ΔR2= .01, ΔF(1, 323) = 4.16; 
Appendix G and Figure 2A): For participants with a proximal perspective (low-level construal) 
fear was positively associated with risk perceptions (ß = .37, t = 4.84, p < .001), that is, the 
more people were afraid of climate change, the more they perceived it as a risk. Although fear 
was also positively related to risk perceptions among participants with a distant mind-set (ß = 
.14, t = 1.88, p = .06), this relationship was substantially weaker than among participants with a 
proximal perspective (Figure 2A). This pattern is consistent with the prediction that low-level 
construal fear was more informative for participants with a proximal perspective.  
In terms of personal mitigation intentions, a similar interaction between distance and 
fear was found (ß = .15, t = 2.15, p = .03, ΔR2= .01, ΔF(1, 323) = 4.61; Appendix G and Figure 
2B): The more people reported fear in the proximal condition, the more they were willing to 
take personal actions (ß = .37, t = 4.84, p < .001). A similar trend was found in the distant 
condition, although again this was substantially weaker than in the proximal condition (ß = .15, 
t = 2.00, p = .05; Figure 2B). Thus, participants who received proximal information again 
relied more strongly on fear when thinking about personal actions than those who received 
distant information, which is consistent with the expectation based on CLT and the findings 
from Study 1.  
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Figure 2. Simple slopes of psychological distance predicting risk perceptions (A) and 
mitigation intentions (B) for 1 SD below the mean of low-level construal fear and 1 SD above 
the mean of fear.  
 
With regard to support for mitigation policies, the analysis did not reveal a significant 
interaction (ß = .06, t = .76, p = .45, ΔR2= .00, ΔF(1, 323) = .57, Appendix G). For this 
analysis, the only theoretically relevant significant effect was of fear (ß = .19, t = 3.42, p < 
.001), indicating that those who experienced more fear were more inclined to support 
mitigation policies. The distance manipulation had no effect beyond this, thus increasing 
proximity again had no straightforward effect on policy support.  
All in all, the analyses using spontaneous, self-reported fear revealed very similar 
patterns to those found in Study 1 and provided additional evidence suggesting that 
psychological distance moderates what information people rely on when they make judgments 
and decisions. However, the absence of this interaction when fear was manipulated raises the 
question as to why manipulated fear leads to different results than measured fear (see next 
section for a discussion of possible explanations). Importantly, Study 2 confirmed that simple 
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proximization of climate change is not an effective strategy to increase individual action on 
climate change.  
4. General Discussion  
Moving people’s attention from distant to proximal consequences of climate change is 
often suggested as a strategy to increase their sense of urgency and their motivation to respond 
to this issue (e.g., CRED, 2009; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009). However, from the 
perspective of CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010) – an approach that is concerned with how 
the psychological distance that lies between a person and what she or he is thinking about 
affects mental processes such as making judgments and decisions – it seems unlikely that 
zooming in on proximal climate change will have a direct effect on people’s motivation to 
respond to climate change (see also Brügger, Dessai, Devine-Wright, Morton, & Pidgeon, 
2015). Instead, CLT suggests that psychological distance determines what kinds of information 
people rely on to make judgments and decisions. Based on this perspective it was predicted and 
found that increasing the psychological proximity of climate change would not increase 
individuals’ motivation to respond to climate change. The absence of a direct effect of the 
distance manipulation on climate-related responses parallels the findings of other studies that 
have also failed to find this (Schoenefeld & McCauley, 2015; Shwom et al., 2008; Spence & 
Pidgeon, 2010). Indeed, there is now more evidence that proximising climate change does not 
directly increase relevant individual action than there is evidence for this effect. 
Instead, it was found that distance interacted with other things to determine individual 
responses. Participants with a proximal perspective relied more on corresponding self-reported 
low-level construal fear (Studies 1 and 2) when they made risk judgments and when deciding 
about possible responses. Conversely, when participants had a distant perspective on climate 
change, they based their perceptions and decisions more on abstract construals, which were 
operationalized as the extent to which people hold generalized sceptical beliefs about climate 
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change (Study 1). Importantly, the directions of these relationships were almost without 
exception consistent with previous research: More fear in the proximal condition was 
associated with greater perception of risk and more willingness to respond to climate change 
(Leiserowitz, 2006; Meijnders et al., 2001; Smith & Leiserowitz, 2012; Van Zomeren et al., 
2010) and more scepticism in the distant condition was associated with lower perception of 
risk and less willingness to respond (Blennow & Persson, 2009; Joireman et al., 2010; 
Leiserowitz, 2006). In other words, these patterns appear to bear out insights about the impact 
of psychological distance on mental processes (e.g., Eyal et al., 2009; Ledgerwood, Trope, & 
Chaiken, 2010) within the context of climate change. 
The findings of Studies 1 and 2 have at least two important implications for theory and 
practice. First, our findings suggest that the role of psychological distance and the effects of 
proximising are more complex than is commonly assumed. In particular, the frequent 
suggestion to highlight proximal consequences of climate change (e.g., CRED, 2009; 
Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006) conflicts with the current theoretical and empirical standing of 
this strategy. According to CLT, distant events and decisions do not imply less engagement or 
involvement – as long as the event or decision will somehow and sometime become relevant to 
the individual (e.g., Ledgerwood, Trope, & Chaiken, 2010; Ledgerwood, Wakslak, & Wang, 
2010). As such, proximising climate change does not automatically imply more involvement or 
engagement than more distant climate change, which is also consistent with previous 
implementations of the proximising strategy and the absence of direct effects of this (Shwom et 
al., 2008; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010). Thus, it seems important that researchers and climate 
change communicators acknowledge the complex influence of psychological distance. More 
specifically, revising the widely held view that proximising is simply and straightforwardly an 
effective strategy to motivate action on climate change may help to avoid disappointment about 
unsuccessful research projects and ineffective campaigns.   
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Second, the finding that psychological distance influences the kind of information 
people act on (rather than whether or not they act at all) points to the possibility that increasing 
distance can also increase responses to climate change provided it is combined with the “right” 
information (i.e., high-level construal information). In other words, a distant mental 
perspective might offer new opportunities for engaging with climate change (for a similar 
argument, see Brügger, Morton, & Dessai, 2015; Spence et al., 2012). One crucial opportunity 
is to create messages with either consistently concrete or consistently abstract information. 
When messages elicit a certain processing mode among people (i.e., a concrete vs. an abstract 
mind-set) and then provide information that fits people’s current perspective (e.g., low-level 
construal fear vs. high-level construal scepticism), people will perceive the message as more 
fluent, easier to process, and more persuasive. Such “fitting” messages are therefore more 
effective at influencing how people act than messages that do not create fit (Kim et al., 2009; 
White, MacDonnell, & Dahl, 2011). 
The idea of matching the right pieces of information is also relevant when considering 
the conceptual differences between the type of response (mitigation and adaptation) and the 
level of implementation (e.g., personal intentions and support for policies). Adaptation and 
mitigation are understood to work at different temporal and spatial scales (e.g., Füssel & Klein, 
2006; Klein, Schipper, & Dessai, 2005). Adaptation typically focuses on measures that are 
spatially and temporally close and that yield immediate local benefits (low-level construal). In 
contrast, mitigation requires action around the globe and yields temporally delayed global 
benefits (high-level construal). The spatiotemporal differences between adaptation and 
mitigation suggest that people may construe these response strategies at different levels of 
psychological distance (Haden, Niles, Lubell, Perlman, & Jackson, 2012). Moreover, 
behavioural intentions and support for policies can be distinguished in terms of the social 
dimension of psychological distance: Personal behavioural steps focus on the individual and 
involve little psychological distance (low-level construal), whereas implementing policies 
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implies collective action and the involvement of strangers and therefore entails more social 
distance (high-level construal, Brügger, Morton, & Dessai, 2015). Extending our analysis, we 
believe that communicators could further increase the effectiveness of climate change 
messages if they follow the principles of creating “fitting” messages to the actions they are 
trying to encourage. 
There are also some counter-intuitive propositions that follow from the present findings 
and reasoning. For example, there is reason to believe that in some circumstances an abstract 
and distant framing of climate change is superior to a concrete and proximal framing (see also 
Brügger, Dessai et al., 2015; Brügger, Morton, & Dessai, 2015; Fujita, Clark, & Freitas, 2014; 
McDonald, Chai, & Newell, 2015; Spence et al., 2012). Generally speaking, when people have 
a psychologically distant perspective, they are more likely to act in a way that is consistent 
with their central values and attitudes (e.g., Eyal et al., 2009; Ledgerwood, Trope, & Chaiken, 
2010). This pattern has also been observed in the context of environmentally friendly 
behaviour (Rabinovich et al., 2010). Thus, framing climate change as a distant issue could help 
people with climate-friendly attitudes to act in accordance with their long-term goals. 
A limitation of this research was that the samples were not representative of the general 
population in the UK. Participants of Study 1 were mainly female students. Although the 
sample of Study 2 was older (mean age: 32 years), more balanced in terms of gender (females: 
56.4%), and was demographically relatively diverse, it was still not representative of the UK 
population (Appendix E). Representativeness is indeed an important issue, especially when one 
wants to make claims about the prevalence of specific beliefs and attitudes in the population. 
However, the purpose of this research was to study psychological processes. Although these 
processes could – at least in principle – differ across different sections of the general 
population, unrepresentative samples are typically unproblematic in terms of external validity 
(e.g., Druckman & Kam, 2011). Therefore, the limited representativeness of our sample is 
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unlikely to represent a significant threat to the findings of this study. It should, nonetheless, be 
noted and considered an important limitation. 
Another limitation that we would like to discuss in more detail is that Study 2 did not 
reveal the predicted interactions when the two factors of psychological distance (proximal vs. 
distant) and fear (low vs. high) were systematically varied. The predicted interactions were 
only observed when – analogously to Study 1 – measured fear was substituted as a moderator. 
More specifically, participants in the proximal (vs. distant) condition relied more on self-
reported fear when they made risk judgments and when they decided about whether they 
wanted to take personal actions on climate change. This raises the question as to how the 
differences between measured fear and manipulated fear can be explained.  
One possible explanation as to why measured fear and manipulated fear may have led 
to different outcomes is that the assumed causal relationship between fear and the variables 
that were treated as dependent variables is actually reversed. More specifically, it could be that 
increased risk perceptions lead to more fear. If it were so, it would not be surprising that 
eliciting fear does not increase risk perceptions. However, while this explanation is plausible 
with regard to risk perceptions, it is less intuitively obvious why personal intentions to mitigate 
and stronger support for policies should lead to more fear – and yet, interactive effects of fear 
on each of these variables were also observed. Nonetheless, reverse causality is not entirely 
implausible since people do sometimes use their past behaviours to infer how they feel about 
an issue (Bem, 1972). 
Second, it is possible that a process other than fear is responsible for the effects 
observed when spontaneous (measured) fear was used as moderator. For example, the extent to 
which people value their (proximal) natural environment (e.g., Brügger, Kaiser, & Roczen, 
2011), have strong social ties to people in their community (Hidalgo & Hernandez, 2001), or 
are more generally attached to proximal places (Altman & Low, 1992; Scannell & Gifford, 
2013) could increase their fear of the negative consequences of climate change. This could 
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explain why measured fear of (proximal) consequences is more important when proximal (vs. 
distant) consequences are made salient. Concomitantly, if a process other than fear is 
responsible for the observed interactions between psychological distance and spontaneous 
(measured) fear, then manipulating fear is obviously not tapping into the “right” process. Thus, 
this would also explain why manipulating fear does not lead to the same results as when fear is 
measured. Future research could explore the role of individual differences systematically by 
including corresponding measures (e.g., appreciation of nature, Brügger et al., 2011; place 
attachment at relevant scales, Devine-Wright, Price, & Leviston, 2015; Tu, Khare, & Zhang, 
2012) as additional control variables and potential moderators of the influence of fear (and 
possibly also of proximising).  
A third explanation for the slightly inconsistent pattern is that the fear manipulation did 
not affect the same aspect of fear that is captured when people report their spontaneous levels 
of fear. For example, it could be argued that spontaneously occurring fear reflects individuals’ 
enduring tendencies to experience fear (i.e., trait fear) while the part of fear that is influenced 
by the manipulation is a more situational and therefore ephemeral fear experience (i.e., state 
fear; see also Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Differences between trait and state fear could lead to 
different outcomes. To illustrate, people who are generally fearful (i.e., for whom fear is a trait) 
pay more attention to negative information (Cisler & Koster, 2010), rely more strongly on fear 
to make judgments and decisions (Gasper & Clore, 1998), and also tend to avoid risks (Maner 
et al., 2007). Thus, it could be that fearful individuals are more likely to rely on their feelings 
of fear and to avoid risks than non-fearful individuals. It is unclear, though, why this tendency 
would be more pronounced when fearful individuals have a proximal perspective and think 
concretely as compared to when they have a more distant perspective and think more abstractly 
(as was found in both studies). One rather speculative explanation for the finding that trait fear 
was more relevant in the proximal (vs. distant) condition is that different traits might vary with 
regard to their levels of concreteness or abstractness. Values, for example, are commonly 
Proximising climate change reconsidered 36
regarded as broad and very general life orientations. In contrast to these, differences in the 
tendency to experience fear seem indeed more concrete. Thus, even though trait fear may be an 
individual characteristic that is stable over time and across different situations, the emotional 
component may still make this trait a concrete or low-level feature that people relied more on 
when they had a proximal (vs. a distant) perspective.  
Another aspect of the present research that warrants some thought is the way 
psychological distance was operationalized. To examine the influence of distance, we used 
terms such as “where I live” and names of cities and regions in the UK when climate change 
was framed as a “proximal” issue. By contrast, “distant” climate change was operationalized 
with terms such as “worldwide” and by naming cities and regions in countries other than where 
participants lived (Appendix A and B). It would be interesting to explore the role of spatial 
distance more systematically and see how the findings presented in this research change when 
people were presented with information about negative climate change impacts at various 
scales (e.g., planet, continent, country, region, town, neighbourhood). From the perspective of 
CLT one would expect that the tendency to rely on concrete information (e.g., low-level 
construal fear) should become more pronounced with more proximising, whereas the tendency 
to rely on abstract information (e.g., high-level construal scepticism) should increase with 
greater distance. However, individual differences such as how strongly people feel attached to 
places at different spatial scales may complicate matters (Devine-Wright et al., 2015; Tu et al., 
2012). To illustrate, it is possible that people who have always lived in the same place and who 
do not travel a lot care most about proximal consequences of climate change, while more 
mobile people respond more strongly to framings that use larger scales (Devine-Wright, 2013).  
The last aspect of the present research that we would like to discuss concerns the 
potential interplay between different dimensions of psychological distance. The embedding of 
our spatial distance manipulation within the broader context of climate change may have 
simultaneously affected multiple dimensions of psychological distance. For example, using the 
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Industrial Revolution as a point of reference to quantify past changes in average temperatures, 
and mentioning the year 2100 in connection with projected increases in temperature (Appendix 
B) both introduce the dimension of temporal distance. Wordings such as “most scientists 
attribute” and “the yield of wheat could decrease by up to 5%” (Appendix B) imply different 
levels of certainty and could affect the dimension of hypotheticality. Moreover, reading about 
people who live in cities or rural areas induces feelings of social similarity to different degrees 
depending on the reader’s place of residence.  
In principle, the references to events that are proximal versus distant on other 
dimensions of psychological distance could have influenced the effectiveness of our spatial 
distance manipulation. For example, it is possible that the reference to future consequences of 
climate change may have increased the tendency to see climate change as a psychologically 
distant issue and, correspondingly, to represent it on a relatively more abstract level. A more 
abstract mind-set would have been consistent with the (spatially) distant condition and might 
have strengthened its effect. In contrast, the outlook of future events and the corresponding 
abstract mind-set would have been inconsistent with the predicted concrete mind-set in the 
(spatially) proximal condition and might have weakened the tendency to think concretely.  
Having said this, the partially successful manipulation checks in Studies 1 and 2 
suggest that it is unlikely that the references to other dimensions of psychological distance 
neutralized the effect of the manipulation. We believe that the interaction between the four 
dimensions of psychological distance is a promising avenue of research and strongly encourage 
future studies to look more systematically at these interactions, for example, by conducting 
experiments where several dimensions are manipulated simultaneously (see also Kim, Zhang, 
& Li, 2008; McDonald et al., 2015; Zhang, He, Zhu, & Cheng, 2014). 
A strength of the present research was that it shed some new light on the interplay 
between emotions and psychological distance, which is still an under-researched area (for a 
notable exception, see Hart, Stedman, & McComas, 2015). There are at least two sets of 
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questions that could be addressed by future research. First, it would be interesting to test the 
prediction that low-level construal emotions in general (not only fear) are more relevant for 
judgments and decision-making when people have a psychologically proximal perspective. 
Another avenue for future research is related to the idea that some emotions involve distancing 
on at least one dimension of psychological distance (e.g., anticipation involves projections into 
the future). As such, high-level construal emotions require more mental construal and are 
believed to be represented at a more abstract level than emotions that do not involve distancing 
(Liberman et al., 2007). Following the idea that people preferentially rely on information that is 
consistent with their current mind-set, one would expect that when people think of climate 
change as a distant phenomenon, high-level construal emotions would have a similarly strong 
influence on judgments and decisions as high-construal beliefs. Future research could test these 
expectations by combining different low-level (e.g., fear, sadness, and anger) and high-level 
emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, and hope) with psychological distance and proximity. Because 
currently there is only little research available on this theoretically assumed differentiation of 
low-level and high-level construal emotions, investigations into this direction would also 
benefit our understanding of CLT more generally.  
5. Conclusion  
The findings presented in this research challenge the idea that simply proximising climate 
change increases individuals’ motivation to act. Instead, consistent with CLT, our results 
suggest that psychological distance does not straightforwardly translate into different levels of 
engagement with climate change. Rather, variation in psychological distance seems to 
influence what perceptions and decisions are based on (low- vs. high-level construal 
information). Consistent with this idea we show that fear (a low-level emotion) is a stronger 
predictor of risk perceptions and certain forms of policy support when people are in a proximal 
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mind-set, whereas more abstract beliefs associated with scepticism are stronger predictors of 
these things when people are in a distant mind-set.  
In a nutshell, then, the role of psychological distance (i.e., proximising) is more 
complex than people seem to assume. This may imply dashed hopes and expectations on the 
one hand; but the complexities revealed in this research also offer room for creative and 
innovative new avenues to communicate climate change. More generally, this work suggests 
that it may be time to put accepted wisdom more fully to the test when applying established 
psychological theories to the task of improving climate change communication.
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A. Manipulation of psychological distance (Study 1; distant condition in italics): 
 
What is climate change and what are the consequences? 
‘Climate’ is defined the average weather experienced in a region over a long period (usually 
more than 30 years). ‘Climate change’ refers to changes in the Earth’s temperature and other 
climate-related phenomena (e.g., rainfalls, wind, humidity) since the end of the 19th century.  
In the UK (Across the globe) average temperatures have risen by about 0.7°C from 1900 to 
2000. It is important to note that changes in average temperatures are associated with other 
climatic changes. For instance, in the UK (all over the world) summers have already become 
hotter and drier whereas winters have become milder and wetter.  
There is now very strong evidence that the observed changes in the climate cannot be 
explained by natural causes alone. Scientists attribute climate change to human past and 
present behaviour, especially to greenhouse gas emissions (i.e., CO2, methane), which 
artificially warm the earth’s atmosphere. Scientists also argue that due to past emissions of 
greenhouse gases the UK (planet) is already committed to a certain amount of climate change 
over the next couple of decades. This will have impacts on humans, animals, and plants.  
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Appendix B. Manipulation of psychological distance (Study 2; distant condition in italics): 
 
What is climate change?  
 
‘Climate’ is defined as the average weather experienced in a region over a long period 
(usually more than 30 years). ‘Climate change’ refers to changes in the Earth’s temperature 
and other climate-related phenomena (e.g., rainfalls, wind, humidity) since the industrial 
revolution. 
 
In the UK, average (Average global) temperatures have risen by about 1°C between 1900 and 
2010. It is important to note that changes in average temperatures are associated with other 
local (global) climatic changes. For instance, in the UK (many places around the world) 
summers have already become hotter and drier. The average duration of very hot summer 
days has increased significantly (worldwide) since 1961 in all regions of the UK. 
 
There is growing evidence that these observed changes in climate cannot be explained by 
natural causes alone. Most scientists attribute recent climate change to human behaviour, 
especially to greenhouse gas emissions (i.e., carbon dioxide, methane), which artificially 
warm the earth’s atmosphere. A substantial proportion of these emissions are caused by 
deforestation and burning fossil fuels – such as oil and coal – to produce food, heat buildings, 
and drive cars. 
 
What are the consequences of climate changes for the UK (world)? 
 
Experts expect that (average global) temperatures in the UK could rise further between 1°C 
and 8°C by 2100. Such temperature rises will have impacts on humans, animals, and plants: 
  
- Hot and dry summers will become much more frequent. The effects of heat-waves will 
not only be experienced in large cities like London, Birmingham, or Manchester (New 
York, Delhi, or Tokyo), where buildings and streets absorb and radiate the energy from 
the sun, but also in small villages. People living in rural areas will also have their share 
of the heat. Droughts and water scarcity will occur more regularly, especially in the  
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Appendix B continued 
 
south of Britain (Central America, Southern Africa, and Southeast Asia). As a 
consequence, local councils (international governments) will need to restrict water use 
within their communities. Although some agricultural areas in North England and 
Scotland (Scandinavia or northern Russia) may benefit from warmer temperatures and 
longer growing seasons, overall climate change will decrease agricultural yields in the 
UK. For example, yield of wheat (rice) could decrease by up to 5% across Britain 
(Southeast Asia). 
 
- Winters and springs will become wetter. Climate change will bring more frequent and 
heavy downpours. More intense rainfalls are likely to be followed by surface water as 
well as sewer and groundwater flooding. Currently, one in six people in England and 
Wales (around the world) are at risk from flooding. Climate change will increase the 
number of buildings and infrastructure at risk from flooding and even threaten people’s 
lives. 
 
- Sea-levels will rise. Scientists predict that the average sea-level around the UK (world) 
will rise by 20 to 60 centimetres or even more in the next 100 years. The following 
regions would be particularly at risk from rising sea-levels and erosion: 
 
- south Wales (Bangladesh) 
- north-west Scotland (China) 
- Yorkshire and Lincolnshire (Philippines) 
- East Anglia (Tuvalu) 
- Thames Estuary (Maldives) 
  
All in all, climate change will have many different impacts on the natural and human 
environment in the UK (around the world). Some of these consequences may seem positive 
(i.e., increased warmth in currently cold regions). But, the majority of changes will be 
negative. 
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Appendix C. Items used in Studies 1 and 2. 
  Studies 
Scales and items 1 2 
Local and personal risk perceptions (N = 7 / 9) 
Water shortages will occur where I live (X) X 
Food shortages will occur where I live (X) - 
Standard of living of many people in the UK will decrease (X) X 
Health problems in the UK will increase (X) X 
Number of species lost in the UK will increase (X) X 
The UK's economic situation will deteriorate (X) - 
More flooding will occur where I live (X) X 
Climate change will have negative consequences for me - X 
Certain effects of climate change will impair my health - X 
I will experience the consequences of severe weather events - X 
I will experience more heat-waves because of climate change - X 
Global risk perception (N = 7 / 5) 
Worldwide water shortages will occur (X) X 
Food shortages will occur in much of the world (X) - 
Standard of living of many people in the world will decrease (X) X 
Health problems in the world will increase (X) X 
Number of species lost in the world will increase (X) X 
The world’s economic situation will deteriorate (X) - 
More flooding will occur worldwide (X) X 
Fear items  (N = 4 / 6) 
Tense X X 
Nervous  X X 
Anxious X X 
Fearful X X 
Frightened - X 
Threatened - X 
Scepticism (N = 6) 
Climate change is caused only by natural processes X - 
Experts are agreed that climate change is a real problem (recoded) X - 
The media is often too alarmist about issues to do with climate change X - 
The evidence for climate change is unreliable X - 
I am uncertain if climate change is happening X - 
I do not believe climate change is a real problem X - 
Psychological distance (N = 5) 
To me, climate change feels very close … very distant - X 
To me, climate change feels like here … like at the other end of the world - X 
To me, climate change feels like tomorrow … like thousands of years away - X 
To me, climate change feels like affecting me … like affecting distant strangers - X 
To me, climate change feels very real … very hypothetical - X 
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Appendix C continued  
  Studies 
Scales and items 1 2 
Mitigation policy support (N =  11 / 11) 
Ban the driving of cars in certain areas X X 
Ban the production of vehicles with gas / fuel mileage below 75 miles per gallon (very fuel efficient) X X 
Increased fuel and diesel taxes X X 
Increased household electricity taxes X X 
Congestion charging on busy roads X X 
Air travel taxation (e.g., on ticket prices) X X 
Subsidies for electric (emission-free) vehicles X X 
Introducing labels stating carbon content X X 
Teach children about the causes, consequences, and potential solutions to climate change X X 
Subsidies for the household production of green energy (e.g., small wind turbines and solar panels) X X 
Increasing general taxation to pay for public transport - X 
Requirement for fossil fuel power stations to implement carbon capture and storage procedures X - 
Adaptation policy support (N = 12) 
Invest in upgrade of flood defences to a higher standard X - 
Tax for protection and creation of wetlands (improves flood protection and contributes to biodiversity) X - 
Close access to vulnerable places, including some recreation areas, marinas, and hiking trails X - 
Reduce pressure on systems or areas at risk (e.g. fewer fishing and hunting licences) X - 
Relocation of dwellings away from flood-prone areas X - 
Increase prices for water consumption (helps to avoid water shortages) X - 
Increase national development assistance to help developing countries to adapt to climate change X - 
Produce and distribute guidance on how to avoid heat stress X - 
Hosepipe restrictions during the summer  X - 
Introduce building codes to make houses more thermally comfortable with longer and hotter summers X - 
Tax to establish a fund to alleviate unavoidable climate change impacts in the UK X - 
Creation of habitat corridors for animals (e.g. bridges over motorways) X - 
Mitigation intentions (N = 10 / 11) 
Choose a car that gets good fuel mileage X X 
Install (more) insulation at home X X 
Car sharing / Use car sharing pools X X 
Using public transport (more often) X X 
Walking and cycling (more) X X 
Replace older appliances with more energy efficient new models (e.g. refrigerators) X X 
Join an environmental group X - 
Carbon offset flights X X 
Eat less meat X X 
Reduce the number of new things you buy X X 
Spend holiday in the UK rather than abroad - X 
Ask your MP to support a strong climate change bill - X 
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Appendix C continued  
Studies 
Scales and items 1 2 
Adaptation intentions (N = 9) 
Repaint your (future) house in a lighter colour (less heat absorption in the summer) X - 
Buy a flood insurance for your (future) house X - 
Install a water re-use system at home (avoid water shortages during droughts) X - 
Donate money to preserve species at risk from climate change X - 
Persuade relatives or friends to move away from flood plains X - 
Fit water saving device in your cistern to save when flushing X - 
Read about how to avoid heat stress during heat waves X - 
Find out how much your (future) house or flat is at risk from flooding X - 
Donate money for projects in developing countries that move housing estates away from areas at risk X - 
Personal efficacy (N = 4) 
I am able to act effectively on climate change - X 
Making a contribution to reduce climate change is easy for me - X 
I can easily adopt a low-carbon lifestyle - X 
Reducing carbon emissions is extremely difficult for me - X 
General action efficacy beliefs (N = 3) 
If everyone does their bit we can reduce climate change - X 
Individual behaviour change (e.g., driving less) is effective in combatting climate change - X 
Introducing new carbon regulations will significantly decrease greenhouse gas emissions - X 
 
Note. X = item used; - = item not used. In Study 1 participants only judged risks on the spatial 
scale that was consistent with the experimental conditions they were assigned to. This is 
indicated with bracketed Xs. 
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Appendix D. Main and interactive effects of distance, scepticism and fear on risk perceptions 
and response measures, holding constant the influence of age and gender.  
  Step 1   Step 2   
  B SEB β R2   B SEB β R2 ΔR2 ΔF 
Risk perception (N = 77)                       
Gender1 -.35 .18 -.20+  .26   -.37 .17 -.21* .39 .13 7.16**
Proximising2 -.40 .14 -.30**     -.41 .13 -.30**       
Fear .07 .09 .08     -.09 .12 -.11       
Scepticism -.26 .10 -.29**     -.53 .12 -.58***       
Proximising X Fear           .38 .17 .33*       
Proximising X Scepticism           .62 .18 .47***       
Mitigation intentions (N = 77)                       
Gender1 -.29 .16 -.18+  .26   -.29 .17 -.18+ .26 .00 0.00 
Proximising2 -.04 .12 -.03     -.04 .13 -.03       
Fear .11 .08 .15     .11 .12 .14       
Scepticism -.34 .09 -.41***     -.34 .13 -.41*       
Proximising X Fear           .01 .17 .01       
Proximising X Scepticism           .00 .18 .00       
Adaptation intentions  (N = 76 )                       
Gender1 -.16 .17 -.10  .26   -.17 .17 -.10 .28 .02 0.99 
Proximising2 .02 .13 .02     .02 .13 .02       
Fear .15 .09 .18+     .07 .13 .08       
Scepticism -.38 .09 -.43***     -.47 .13 -.54***       
Proximising X Fear           .17 .18 .15       
Proximising X Scepticism           .23 .19 .18       
Mitigation policies  (N = 77)                       
Gender1 -.15 .14 -.12  .20   -.15 .14 -.11 .26 .06 2.72+ 
Proximising2 .07 .11 .07     .07 .11 .07       
Fear -.04 .07 -.06     -.21 .11 -.32*       
Scepticism -.30 .08 -.43***     -.35 .10 -.50***       
Proximising X Fear           .33 .14 .37*       
Proximising X Scepticism           .14 .15 .14       
Adaptation policies  (N = 76)                       
Gender1 -.25 .14 -.20+  .23   -.26 .14 -.20+ .28 .05 2.25 
Proximising2 .05 .11 .05     .04 .10 .05       
Fear .04 .07 .06     -.01 .10 -.01       
Scepticism -.28 .07 -.41***     -.41 .10 -.60***       
Proximising X Fear           .13 .14 .15       
Proximising X Scepticism           .30 .14 .31*       
Note. 1 female = 1, male = 2; 2 distant = 0, proximal = 1; *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, + p < .10. 
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Appendix E. Demographic characteristics of participants in Study 2. 
  % 
Gender 
Female 56.4
Male 43.6
Age 
16–24 52.4
25–44 22.7
45–64 19.4
65 and over 5.5
Household yearly income 
Up to £7000 6.1
£7001 - £14000 7.0
£14001 - £21000 7.0
£21001 - £28000 9.7
£28001 - £34000 7.3
£34001 - £41000 6.9
£41001 - £48000 4.8
£48001 - £55000 7.6
£55001 - £62000 6.9
£62001 or more 10.6
Prefer not to say 26.1
Qualifications 
O-levels 1.2
A-level or equivalent 42.4
Higher national diploma 3.7
Degree or equivalent 19.7
Post-graduate qualification 29.7
Prefer not to say 3.3
Area density 
Remote Area 5.2
Village 22.7
Town 31.5
City (Suburban) 22.1
City (Central/Inner Area) 18.5
Political orientation 
far left 2.4
left 15.2
slightly left 23.0
middle 13.6
slightly right 16.4
right 5.2
far right 0.6
Prefer not to say 23.6
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Appendix F. Summary table for two-way analysis of variance of the effects of proximising 
and fear induction on risk perceptions and response measures, holding constant the influence 
of age and gender.  
 
Source df SS MS F p η2
Risk perception           
Age 1 1.66 1.66 3.22 .07 .01 
Gender 1 6.11 6.11 11.84 .00 .04 
Proximising 1 3.42 3.42 6.63 .01 .02 
Fear 1 0.07 0.07 0.13 .72 .00 
Proximising X Fear 1 0.14 0.14 0.27 .60 .00 
Within cells 324 167.27 0.52      
Mitigation intentions          
Age 1 0.08 0.08 0.16 .69 .00 
Gender 1 7.55 7.55 16.34 .00 .05 
Proximising 1 0.04 0.04 0.08 .78 .00 
Fear 1 0.29 0.29 0.64 .43 .00 
Proximising X Fear 1 0.01 0.01 0.03 .87 .00 
Within cells 324 149.76 0.46      
Mitigation policies           
Age 1 0.41 0.41 0.74 .39 .00 
Gender 1 5.77 5.77 10.41 .00 .03 
Proximising 1 0.08 0.08 0.14 .71 .00 
Fear 1 0.30 0.30 0.55 .46 .00 
Proximising X Fear 1 0.64 0.64 1.15 .29 .00 
Within cells 324 179.54 0.55      
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Appendix G. Main and interactive effects of proximising and measured fear on risk 
perceptions and response measures, holding constant the influence of age and gender.  
  Step 1  Step 2   
  B SEB β R2  B SEB β R2 ΔR2 ΔF 
Risk perception              
Age .01 .00 .12* .11  .01 .00 .12* .12 .01 4.16
Gender1 -.24 .08 -.17**    -.25 .08 -.17**       
Proximising2 .22 .08 .15**    .22 .08 .15**       
Self-reported fear .18 .04 .24***    .11 .06 .14+       
Proximising X Fear          .17 .08 .15*       
Mitigation intentions              
Age .00 .00 .04 .11  .00 .00 .04 .12 .01 4.61
Gender1 -.28 .08 -.20***    -.28 .08 -.20***       
Proximising2 .00 .07 .00    .00 .07 .00       
Self-reported fear .18 .04 .25***    .11 .05 .15*       
Proximising X Fear          .16 .08 .15*       
Mitigation policies              
Age .00 .00 .07 .06  .00 .00 .06 .07 .00 0.57
Gender1  -.24 .09 -.16**    -.25 .09 -.16**       
Proximising2 .05 .08 .03    .05 .08 .03       
Self-reported fear .15 .04 .19***    .12 .06 .15*       
Proximising X Fear          .07 .09 .06       
 
Note. N = 329; 1 female = 1, male = 2; 2 distant = 0, proximal = 1; *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * 
p < .05, + p < .10. 
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